I. INTRODUCTION

A. Team Incentives and Peer Evaluations
In the last 20 years, more intensive use of teamwork in organizations has aroused interest with regard to the factors affecting the success of teams (Devine et al., 1999; Kozlowski et al., 1999; Lawler, Mohrman, and Ledford 1995) . One of the crucial elements in the success of teams relates to the choice of the sharing rule for the joint outcome. On the one hand, paying team workers according to their individual contributions instead of assigning them a fixed share of the joint outcome reduces free-riding behaviors (Alchian and Demsetz 1972; Holmström 1982) . 1 On the other hand, rewarding workers according to their individual performance is likely to be costly as individual contributions are typically difficult to evaluate.
In this paper, we analyze the impact on team performance of using peer assessments to share a jointly produced outcome in a laboratory *The author acknowledges financial support from Grant ECO2008-00977/ECON from the Spanish Ministry of Education and from Piuna project of the University of Nevarra. Corgnet: Assistant Professor, Business Department, Universidad de Nevarra, Spain; and LESSAC, ESC Dijon, France. E-mail bcorgnet@unav.es 1. Evidence of free riding in teams when the joint output is equally shared among partners has been found in legal partnerships (Leibowitz and Tollison 1980) as well as in medical group practices (Encinosa, Gaynor, and Rebitzer 2007; Gaynor and Pauly 1990; Newhouse 1973) . At the experimental level, Nalbantian and Schotter (1997) as well as Van Dijk, Sonnemans, and van Winden (2001) have found evidence of free riding in groups when team profits are equally shared among subjects. experiment in which three subjects are randomly matched to work on a real-effort task. Subjects had to complete a real team task for which individual effort and abilities determined joint profits. This allowed us to introduce a dimension of merit in the subjects' decisions concerning peer evaluations. We focus on a small-team context in which the different partners are likely to observe each others' levels of effort and could, in principle, use this information to evaluate their team partners' relative contributions. 2 In our setting, subjects use peer evaluations to determine team members' respective shares of the joint outcome. We impose that the allocation rule for the joint outcome is budget balanced so that subjects cannot allocate an amount of money greater than their team output. In the case of budget-balanced allocation rules, one can derive from Holmström (1982) that purely selfinterested partners will have incentives to lie and undermine the achievements of their coworkers preventing group members from being rewarded according to their relative contribution. 3 As a result, even in a context in which team members are able to assess the contribution of their 2. The focus on small teams can also be motivated by stressing that the success of small teams is a preliminary step for the successful growth of organizations (Weber 2006) .
3. A proof of this result is available upon request.
partners without errors they will have no incentives to offer a balanced and truthful assessment and peer evaluations will affect neither the motivation of team members nor team performance. However, peer ratings have been used in many disciplines such as engineering, management, and medical sciences as a mechanism with which to gather information about individual contributions (Clark, Davies, and Skeers 2005; Conway et al., 1993; Dochy, Segers, and Sluijsmans 1999; Ramsey and Wenrich 1999; Thomas, Gebo, and Hellmann 1999; Tu and Lu 2005; Van Rosendaal and Jennett 1992) , suggesting that reliable information, not accessible to outsiders, can be extracted from such assessments. Our objective is to provide an experimental analysis that helps us assess the impact of such practices on team performance. There are two possible effects at play here. First, if team members effectively report an accurate estimate of the achievements of others, subjects will end up being paid according to a measure of their relative contribution to the joint outcome so that free riding behaviors may be reduced. Second, the use of peer evaluations, by focusing the attention of team partners on each others' contribution may increase peer pressure and reduce free-riding behaviors in teams (Falk and Ichino 2006; Kandel and Lazear 1992) . Evidently, peer evaluations are likely to be imperfect as they can be subject to the influence of team partners through politicking activities or be driven by social norms or pure self-interest. However, peer evaluations allow for the implementation of payment schemes that are based, even though imperfectly, on individuals' contributions without the need for external monitoring. In sum, peer ratings can be seen as an inexpensive mechanism to collect information about workers' contributions.
In this paper, we investigate experimentally the effect on team performance of an allocation mechanism based on peer evaluations. We show that peer evaluations undermine team performance when team members know each other. We account for this result by stressing that peer evaluations are likely to weaken the inherently high level of intrinsic motivation that is usually observed in teams formed by friends as well as exacerbate negative reciprocity among team partners as a result of tighter peer monitoring.
B. Related Experiments
In general, issues related to cooperation in teams can be analyzed experimentally using public good games. In particular, our benchmark design in which group members are rewarded a fixed share of the joint outcome can be seen as a one-shot voluntary contributions mechanism (VCM) with the specificity that subjects work side by side on a real team task in which faceto-face communication is possible. In a VCM subjects decide upon the fraction of the initial endowment that they are willing to contribute to a group account, while keeping the remainder.
The VCM literature stresses those contributions to the collective account increase when subjects are allowed to sanction or reward each other (Fehr and Gächter 2000; Masclet et al., 2003; Sefton, Shupp, and Walker 2007) or when subjects are allowed to communicate (Isaac and Walker 1988; Sally 1995) . In a comparison of these two mechanisms, Bochet, Page, and Putterman (2006) showed that communication, especially when it is face to face, is a more effective mechanism than punishments in reducing free-riding behaviors. As a result, we would expect a low level of free riding in our benchmark design as subjects are involved in a real team task in which face-to-face communication is possible.
The use of peer evaluations in the current paper can be related to VCM experiments in which subjects are given the possibility to reward or punish their partners (Sefton, Shupp, and Walker 2007) . However, as opposed to the results obtained in the VCM literature with punishments and rewards, the introduction of peer assessments in our setting tends to reduce group performance. This difference may simply result from the fact that subjects perceive sanctions and rewards in a VCM game very differently from peer assessments in our real team task experiment. In particular, Fehr and Rockenbach (2003) showed that in a trust game environment sanctions do not systematically increase cooperation if they are perceived as unfair. The authors stress that sanctions that are perceived as unfair destroy altruistic cooperation whereas sanctions perceived as fair tend to promote cooperation. In our experimental design, the introduction of a real team task leads subjects to consider the equal sharing of the joint outcome as the fair norm of behavior (Corgnet, Sutan, and Veszteg 2009; Konow, Saijo, and Akai 2008) . As a result, peer assessments that deviate from the equal splitting norm may be seen as unfair and may reduce cooperation and team performance as a result. 4 In addition, the equality norm appears to be stronger in the case of classmates, suggesting that the existence of interpersonal links may foster the negative perception of payment schemes based on peer evaluations. This sheds light on the fact that peer evaluations have a more negative effect on team performance when subjects know each other.
Our approach also relates to the experimental literature that stresses the crowding-out effect of monitoring on the level of effort exerted by agents in standard principal-agent games (Falk and Kosfeld 2006) . The authors account for this result by stressing that negative reciprocity induces agents to lower their level of effort as a response to the signal of distrust created by the principal's decision to monitor effort. Frey (1993) argues that the crowding-out effect associated to monitoring activities will dominate its disciplining effect in the case of interpersonal relationships, whereas the reverse would be true in the case of abstract relationships. In line with this analysis, we find that in teams composed of friends or classmates peer assessments tend to crowd-out effort, whereas this is not the case for teams that are composed of strangers. Our result is also in line with Dickinson and Villeval (2008) in which case crowding-out of effort is observed for intense levels of monitoring when there exist interpersonal links among participants and as long as distributional issues were at work. The authors attribute this effect to the presence of negative reciprocity as in Falk and Kosfeld (2006) . The limited crowding-out effect encountered in Dickinson and Villeval (2008) may be due to, as the authors themselves indicate, the procedure used to create interpersonal relationships among subjects. In our design, interpersonal relationships exist because subjects know and see each other during the team task, whereas in the study by Dickinson and Villeval (2008) these interpersonal links are created by having partners meet for several minutes at the beginning of the experimental session. The strength of the interpersonal relationship is then likely to be stronger in our design, especially for sessions in which subjects are classmates, and this may explain why crowding-out of effort appears to be stronger in our case. 4 . In Section IIIC, we show that peer evaluations undermine subjects' satisfaction in the case of classmates.
II. DESIGN
A. Subject Pool
We invited subjects through campus-wide posters and e-mail advertisements to participate in our experimental sessions at the University of Navarra in Spain. We recruited 66 subjects that were informed that the experiment concerned decision making and that it would last for approximately 60 minutes. Our experiments were run in sessions with 21 or 24 subjects depending on the treatment. The asymmetric peer evaluations treatment (APE) involved 24 subjects with an average earnings equal to 20.36¤ while the symmetric peer evaluations (SPE) treatment and the equal split treatment (EQS) involved 21 subjects each with average earnings equal to 20.36¤ and 21.74¤, respectively. Subjects were also informed that apart from a show-up fee of 5¤ they would receive a certain amount of money depending on their performance in the laboratory. The majority of students had either a business or an economics major and were completing the third year of their degree.
B. Experimental Procedure
The experiment was divided into two stages. In the first stage of the game, subjects were randomly assigned to a team of three partners in order to complete a real-effort task.
5 The team task is chosen so as to ensure that the following unique characteristics of teams were present: task interdependence, reward interdependence, and social identity (Colquitt, Zapta-Phelan, and Roberson 2005) . Task interdependence was present in our design as some level of communication and coordination between subjects was required, for example, to avoid the same correct answers being found for the task. Also, reward interdependence followed from the payment scheme under which payoffs depended directly on the performance of the team. Finally, social identity could also develop as we had subjects sit side by side and participate in a real-effort task in which communication between team members was allowed. In addition, subjects were assigned the same 5. Other real-effort tasks have been considered in the literature such as solving mazes (Gneezy, Niederle, and Rustichini 2003) or solving an optimization problem (Dickinson and Villeval 2008; Montmarquette et al., 2004; Van Dijk, Sonnemans, and van Winden 2001). function in the team so that no status was created. 6 At the start of the experiment, each team member was assigned a letter that indicated his/her position. Subject L was seated on the left of subject M, whereas Subject R was placed on his/her right. Subjects had to find three-and four-digit numbers fulfilling certain conditions in 18 minutes as is described below. Each correct number was rewarded 45 euro cents, while each incorrect number incurred a penalty of 25 euro cents. Each team had access to only one set of instructions and to only one answer sheet so as to avoid subjects working separately.
7
Task 1: You have 18 minutes to find as many numbers as you can, satisfying the following conditions:
• It has three or four digits.
• If you sum its digits the result is equal to 15.
• If you multiply its digits the result is strictly larger than 10.
• The last two digits are strictly larger than 1.
• The first digit is an odd number.
• The second digit is an even number.
In the second stage of the game subjects were separated and had to answer a series of questions, individually and without the possibility of communication, in order to determine the allocation of the joint outcome obtained in the first stage. These questions as well as the splitting rule for the team outcome varied according to the treatment under study. Then, subjects had to complete Task 2 individually which was exactly the same exercise as Task 1 except that in the second condition the sum of the digits of the number had to give a result equal to 14 instead of 15. As a result, the performance of subjects on Task 2 measures not only the individual ability of the different subjects but also their involvement in the team task as they were basically asked to repeat the team exercise alone. In Task 2, each correct number was rewarded 30 euro cents while each incorrect number implied a penalty of 15 euro cents. 8 6. Our approach can be seen as reward allocation between team members, partners, or coworkers at the same layer of the hierarchy.
7. Each answer sheet consisted of a table of 65 cells where subjects could introduce a number in each cell.
8. We decided to reduce the earnings associated to each correct answer in the individual task compared to the team task. We did so in order to create synergies for teamwork. This particular choice does not affect our analysis.
The allocation rule for the team outcome was determined as follows for the three treatments.
9
Equal Split Treatment (EQS). Before undertaking the team task in Stage 1, each team member knew that he/she would be rewarded one-third of the team profits. In this treatment the allocation rule for the team outcome is exogenous, while in the following two treatments the sharing rule for the joint outcome is determined by peer assessments.
Symmetric Peer Evaluations (SPE).
Before undertaking the team task in Stage 1, each team member knew that the allocation rule for the team outcome would depend on his/her partners' evaluations. In particular, each subject i ∈ {L, M, R} decides anonymously an allocation rule for the team output. That is, team partners choose a triple α i ≡ (α iL , α iM , α iR ) where α ij is the percentage share of the team profits that subject i decides to assign to subject j , where j ∈ {L, M, R} and α iI + α iL + α iM = 1.
10 Subjects knew that the share of the joint outcome obtained by a team partner would be computed as the average of the allocation rules chosen by the three team members. That is, the share of the joint profits obtained by subject j is computed as follows:
Under the standard assumption that subjects are self-interested we should expect that the SPE treatment does not affect team performance compared to the EQS. Indeed, under this hypothesis, subjects will choose α ii = 100% for i ∈ {L, M, R} so that each team partner finally receives one-third of the team outcome as in the case of the EQS. However, if we consider that subjects assess others' contributions taking into account their actual level of performance we should expect team partners' motivation and team performance to increase.
Asymmetric Peer Evaluations (APE).
Before undertaking the team task in Stage 1, team members knew that the allocation rule for the team outcome would depend on their neighbors' assessments. In particular, subjects L and R decide anonymously which proportion of the team profits to assign to subject M. The share of the profits actually obtained by 9 . The decision about the allocation of joint profits was made before subjects knew the exact amount of money they earned on the task. Subjects could obviously form an accurate expectation of their earnings by multiplying the number of answers by 45 euro cents.
10. The allocation rule is budget balanced. subject M is equal to the average of the sharing rules chosen by subjects L and R, that is, (α LM + α RM )/2. At the same time, subject M decides, separately and anonymously, the proportion of the remaining profits to allocate to subjects L and R, respectively. The share of the team outcome assigned to subject L [R] is then computed as follows:
Treatment SPE is characterized by a complete system of peer evaluations in which each subject evaluates the contribution of his/her two team partners, whereas, in Treatment APE, subjects evaluate only the contribution of his/her neighbor(s).
Under the standard assumption that subjects are purely self-interested we should expect that the APE treatment increases the level of motivation of subjects L and R compared to the equal split treatment and induces subject M not to work on the task. Indeed, under this hypothesis, subjects L and R will set α LM = α RM = 0 so that subject M does not receive anything from joint profits. However, if we consider that team partners tell the truth about partners' achievements we may expect that free-riding behaviors will be reduced as in the case of Treatment SPE.
At the end of the experimental session subjects had to complete a questionnaire that was used to assess their level of motivation in the different tasks, their level of satisfaction in the tasks and their possible connections with the other team partners.
III. RESULTS
We present our results as well as the statistical analysis supporting our findings in the next subsections. 11. Maximum team task profits are equal to 29.7¤ and maximum profits on the individual task are equal to 15.9¤.
A. Payment Schemes and Team Performance
We first compare team performance in the different treatments. Our findings are summarized as follows.
RESULT 1 (Equal split versus peer evaluations). The use of peer evaluations leads to lower levels of performance than the equal split allocation rule.
Support. Our first result is illustrated in Table 1 .
We stress that the team performance in the EQS is 11.3% higher than in the peer evaluations treatments and this difference is statistically significant (p-value < .05).
12 The high level of team performance in the EQS is consistent with the study of Van Dijk, Sonnemans, and van Winden (2001) in which team incentives led to high levels of performance in a real-effort public good game. Our result is also consistent with the fact that in VCM games very low levels of free riding are observed when face-to-face communication is possible as is the case in our experimental design (Bochet, Page, and Putterman 2006; Sally 1995) . We are then in a case in which rigid sharing rules outperform a decentralized mechanism based on peer assessments. We consider a possible explanation for this puzzling result in the following subsection by focusing on the crucial role of friendship in mediating the effect of peer assessments on team performance.
B. Acquaintanceship and Team Performance
In this section, we analyze the mechanism underlying the effect of peer evaluations treatments on team performance by considering the role of acquaintanceship among team members.
12. The p-values for Student's tests and Wilcoxon ranksum tests comparing team performance across treatments are available in Table A1 . 
where P i is the joint profits of team i, X i is an aggregate measure of the experience of subjects in team i in similar tasks, and EQS i stands for a dummy variable that takes value one if team i has been involved in the EQS and takes value zero otherwise. We denote A i as a measure of the degree of acquaintanceship in team i that accounts for the existing connections between the different partners of the team. The measure of acquaintanceship is based on a questionnaire completed anonymously by subjects at the end of the experimental session. Subjects were asked to indicate whether each team partner was a stranger, a classmate, or a friend. The measure of acquaintanceship takes value j ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} if there exist exactly j different pairs of team partners that mutually acknowledge either knowing each other or being friends. 14 In our sample, a significant proportion of teams (27.3%) exhibits no acquaintanceship (A i = 0) and in the majority of teams (68.2%) one or two subjects know each other (A i ∈ {1, 2}).
Concerning the level of experience of team members, we use data on subjects' participation in related experiments in which subjects had to solve similar number tasks individually and by pairs (Corgnet, Sutan, and Veszteg 2009) . In this type of tasks there exists a learning effect so that people repeating the task usually do better than subjects completing this type of task for the first time. We control for this effect by introducing the variable X i that measures 13. We also tried non-linear specifications for team partners' experience (X i ) producing similar results.
14. We identified three cases in which a subject claimed to know someone that claimed to be a stranger. the aggregate experience of subjects in team i. In particular, X i ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} is the number of team i members who already participated in a similar experiment. The regression estimates are displayed in Table 2 with standard errors given in parentheses. 15 As a result of our regression analysis in the case in which partners' experience is used as a control variable for group members' abilities, the slope for acquaintanceship is positive for the EQS (−3.994 + 4.800 = 0.806), whereas it is negative in the case of peer evaluations treatments (−3.994) . 16 We conclude that the negative impact of peer evaluations on team performance is mediated by the magnitude of acquaintanceship in teams. That is, peer assessments tend to reduce joint profits when subjects know each other. On the contrary, acquaintanceship tends to facilitate cooperation and team performance when joint profits are shared equally. This result is interesting as it helps us understand the popularity of the equal sharing of joint outcomes in contexts in which acquaintanceship is likely to play a role as in the case of partnerships and entrepreneurial teams. 17 We illustrate Result 2 by stressing that in the absence of acquaintanceship (A i = 0) team performances tend to be higher under peer evaluations (94.1%) compared to the EQSs (89.9%), whereas teams characterized by high levels of acquaintanceship (A i ∈ {2, 3}) tend to perform better under an equal splitting rule (95.1%) than in the presence of peer ratings (70.1%). In order to provide additional support for Result 2 we decided to 15. We also build an aggregate measure of the ability of the team partners by considering either the average (AV ) or the maximum performance (MAX ) of the three partners on the individual task performed in Stage 2. We obtained similar regression results in those two cases as is shown in the Appendix of Supporting Information (Table S1) .
16. The coefficients associated to fellowship (α 1 ) and to the interaction effect (α 4 ) appeared to be highly significant in all the estimated specifications of the model. Notice that run additional sessions for both the equal sharing treatment (EQS) and the symmetric peer evaluations treatment (SPE) using classmates as subjects so as to ensure that interpersonal relationships were sufficiently high.
C. Classmates, Peer Evaluations, and Team Performance
We recruited 99 subjects for three additional sessions. Subjects were informed that apart from a show-up fee of 5 euros they would receive a certain amount of money depending on their performance in the laboratory. The students recruited for each treatment were classmates and knew each other, that is A i = 3. Indeed, we recruited subjects from the same cohort of 180 students that attend all compulsory courses together. Also, for each compulsory course students are divided in five small groups of 30-40 students for practical classes. These groups are formed at the beginning of the academic year. In this experiment, we enrolled three of the five groups.
18 Subjects had a Business major and were completing the third year of their degree. The symmetric peer evaluations (SPEC) treatment and the equal split treatment (EQSC) involved 30 subjects each with average earnings equal to 18.97¤ and 16.36¤, respectively.
In the endogenous team formation treatment (E-SPEC) we recruited 39 subjects with an average earnings equal to 16.36¤. This treatment constitutes a variation of the SPE treatment in which subjects selected their team partners at their entrance to the laboratory so as to ensure that groups would be mainly composed of friends.
19 Indeed, the large majority (61.5%) of subjects recognized using friendship as the main criterion to compose their group while a significant proportion of subjects (21.5%) selected their team partners for being perceived as cooperative. 20 We now compare team performance 18. Participation rate was high (around 85% for all sessions) because experiments were part of the requirement for the course in the sense that a student cannot miss more than two practical sessions out of six and were completed at the same time as regular practical classes. Treatment (E-SPEC) had more participants because the corresponding group is slightly larger (45 students).
19. Subjects had 10 minutes to choose team partners in the room. At the end of the 10 minutes if some subjects were not matched the experimenter would form the remaining groups arbitrarily. It appears that all subjects were matched at the end of the 10-minute period so that the experimenter did not have to intervene. 20. Notice that only one subject claimed to have chosen team partners based on talent. across the different treatments with classmates. As is shown in Table 3 , team performance under the equal splitting rule is 20.4% higher than under peer evaluations. In the treatments that did not involve classmates (EQS, SPE, and APE) this difference in team performance was only equal to 11.3%. We conjecture from the results displayed in Table 3 that when interpersonal relationships are important as is the case in teams composed of classmates the negative effect of peer evaluations on performance is particularly strong. We illustrate this conjecture in Figure 1 below in which we represent average team performance for the different treatments with and without classmates.
We conclude, similarly to the case of subjects that were not classmates, that team performance is on average significantly higher under the equal splitting rule compared to peer evaluations treatments. This finding provides additional support for Result 1 (p-value < 0.05). In addition, we find that team performance in peer evaluations treatments is significantly higher in the groups composed of classmates compared to groups that did not involve classmates (p-value < 0.05). This finding confirms Result 2, that is the negative effect of peer evaluation on team performance increases when team partners know each other. 21 Finally, we find that classmates tend to provide significantly higher assessments of their teamwork experience under the equal splitting rule than in the presence of peer evaluations (p-value < 0.05). (Table S4 ).
FIGURE 1
Team Performance Across Treatments, Measured as the Ratio Between Actual Profits Generated by the 
D. Intrinsic Motivation, Negative Reciprocity, and Crowding-Out of Effort
In this section, we investigate the possible explanations for the negative effect of peer evaluations on team performance when interpersonal considerations are present. Following Dickinson and Villeval (2008) , we consider both reciprocity effects and the crowding-out of intrinsic motivation as potential mechanisms underlying the negative effect of peer evaluations on team performance in the presence of interpersonal relationships.
We focus first on the crowding-out of intrinsic motivation that suggests that the use of peer ratings among fellows or friends may undermine the motivation of subjects if team members are intrinsically motivated to contribute to the team and help their partners. This is likely to be the case among friends who are inclined to behave altruistically to each other. Altruistic individuals are able to reduce free riding in teams as shown by Rotemberg (1994 Rotemberg ( , 2006 as it permits subjects to commit to exerting high levels of efforts. However, in line with the self-perception theory developed in Social Psychology (Lepper 1973; Lepper, Greene, and Nisbett 1973) the presence of peer evaluations may decrease the intrinsic motivation of friends. Indeed, team partners who are naturally inclined to help each other may fear that in the presence of peer evaluations their altruistic behavior could be interpreted as purely self-interested. As a result, subjects may refrain from contributing to the joint effort. The fact that explicit rewards tend to obscure the true motives of helping behavior has been formalized by Bénabou and Tirole (2006) .
We assess the subjects' motivation in a debriefing questionnaire in which participants had to evaluate their level of motivation in the different tasks. In particular, subjects involved in the peer evaluations treatments had to choose one of the following statements. The results of the questionnaire stress that close to half the participants (42.2%) in peer evaluation treatments without classmates (SPE and APE) state that their motivation increased because of the use of peer ratings while this proportion is only 26.1% for the peer evaluations treatments involving classmates (SPEC and E-SPEC). Also, we reject the test that the proportion of subjects that felt motivated by the use of peer evaluations is the same for the classmate sample and for the initial samples (p-value = .05). 23 We conclude that teams composed of 23. We use a two-sided t-test. Similar results are obtained if we include in the classmates sample all the teams from the two initial samples for which all partners knew at least one of the other team members (A i > 1). subjects who know each other (classmates) tend to be significantly less motivated by the use of peer evaluations than teams composed of strangers. This finding suggests that friends are likely to respond negatively to the use of a mechanism like peer evaluations, which explicitly rewards their contribution to the team. The results on motivation as well as the results on satisfaction from the previous section stress that classmates tend to respond negatively to peer evaluations. If we interpret friendship as a source of intrinsic motivation that would lead to an increase in motivation in teamwork (Lepper 1973, Lepper, Greene, and Nisbett 1973) , then the reduction in motivation that follows from the use of peer evaluations could be interpreted as evidence for the crowding-out of intrinsic motivation among fellow subjects.
Another possible interpretation of our results relies in peer monitoring and negative reciprocity. The argument is that peer evaluations intensify the level of peer monitoring because subjects are willing to provide an accurate assessment of each partner's contribution or simply because their attention is focused on the contributions of others in the instructions of the peer evaluations treatments as in the study by and Epley, Caruso and Bazerman (2006) . Also, if we consider that negative reciprocity is magnified when interpersonal relationships are present then we may expect that subjects who know each are more likely to react negatively to increased monitoring and may reduce their level of effort as a result (Dickinson and Villeval 2008; Falk and Kosfeld 2006) . 24 Next, we focus on the peer assessments made by team partners in order to assess the motives underlying the allocation of the joint outcome and then shed light on the mechanisms underlying the impact of peer evaluations on team performance.
E. Equity and Equality Norms in Peer Assessments (Shorten)
We analyze the motives that underlie partner ratings in peer evaluations treatments. We stress the fact that two competing norms, the equality and the equity norms respectively, drive subjects' choices to allocate the joint outcome, 24 . In general, we may expect that the importance of other-regarding preferences increases when subjects care and know about each other. whereas very few subjects follow pure selfinterest. The equality norm applies when a subject decides to split the future joint outcome evenly independently of the relative contributions, whereas subjects follow the equity norm when they assign a larger share of the joint outcome to the team partner with a higher relative contribution. In order to assess the relevance of the equity norm we use the data on the performance of the subjects in Task 2 as a measure of the relative contribution of each team member in Task 1. 25 We have to keep in mind the extreme similarity between the two tasks implying that a partner's performance on Task 2 is likely to be an accurate signal for the subject's contribution to the performance obtained in the collective Task 
Our characterization of the equity norm follows directly from the proportionality principle under which fair allocations should depend on the subjects' inputs determined by both effort and ability. We consider that a subject uses the equity norm when he/she decides to assign the future team outcome with respect to his/her knowledge of the relative contribution of the different team partners where relative contributions depend both on ability and effort. We summarize our findings on the relative importance of either norm in the following result.
RESULT 3 (Equity and equality norms and peer evaluations). Even though a majority of peer assessments are driven by equality concerns, a significant proportion of assessments are also consistent with equity concerns.
Support. The prevalence of the equality norm follows from the fact that a majority of subjects (56.1%) chose a strictly egalitarian allocation rule giving one-third of the joint output to each team member. Also, we find strong egalitarianism concerns (68.2% of the claims) in the treatments involving classmates whether they self-selected into teams or not. We disregard 25. This measure of relative contribution is consistent with the subjects' assessments of each team partner's contribution reported at the end of Stage 2 in the case of Treatment APE. the possibility that the high level of egalitarianism observed with classmates is because of a lower level of dispersion in the subjects' abilities. 26 We find that the average dispersion in the subjects' abilities for a given team is not significantly different between teams composed of strangers compared to teams composed of classmates.
27 Also, a significant proportion (26.3%) of the subjects' allocation rules are consistent with equity. The extensive use of the equity norm implies that subjects are interested in appearing as hard team workers in order to obtain a large share of the team outcome. Indeed, if strict equality was the only relevant factor in explaining the subjects' peer assessments, then each subject would be rewarded with certainty one-third of the team outcome as in the case of the EQS. In that case as well as in the case of pure self-interest we would expect peer evaluations to have no effect on either motivation or team performance.
IV. DISCUSSION
In this paper, we have emphasized that using sharing rules for team outcomes that depend on peer evaluations instead of using equal splitting rules decreased team performance. In particular, we found that peer evaluations undermine team performance when team members know each other. We accounted for this result by stressing that peer evaluations are likely to weaken the high level of intrinsic motivation that is usually observed in teams formed by friends.
We finally identified the main determinants of peer evaluations emphasizing that the majority of subjects exhibit equality concerns and decide to split the team outcome equally among partners. However, a significant proportion of subjects base their peer evaluations on the relative contribution of their partners. In that case, peer evaluations can possibly affect the subjects' motivation and team performance as partners have an incentive to appear as high contributors.
Our findings give support for the use of fixed sharing rules in partnerships and entrepreneurial teams that are frequently formed among friends. Also, our results suggest to use peer evaluations among workers who hardly know each 26. Dispersion of partners' abilities is measured as the standard deviation of team partners' performance on the individual task completed in Stage 2.
27. We find that the p-value is equal to 0.3210 for the t-test and it is equal to 0.3873 for the Wilcoxon rank-sum test.
other as can be the case for example of virtual groups that use computer-mediated communication to interact with colleagues in different locations. However, we would recommend a move from peer ratings to the equal splitting rule whenever peer workers develop interpersonal relationships.
As an agenda for future research, one could attempt to establish institutional frameworks in which the commonly used equal splitting rule is dominated by peer evaluations rules. This may be the case in a context in which free riding is particularly high as is likely to occur if tasks are complex or if teams are large. We may also analyze whether subjects' motivation and team performance can be improved by letting team partners choose whether to use an equal splitting rule or peer evaluations. Please note: Wiley-Blackwell are not responsible for the content or functionality of any supporting materials supplied by the authors. Any queries (other than missing material) should be directed to the corresponding author for the article.
